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Abstract 
 
The dispatch of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps (CEP) to France in 1917 was 
envisaged by Portuguese interventionists as an affirmation of Portugal’s desire to 
reclaim an independent role in world affairs, emerging from the shadow of British 
influence. However, the CEP relied on the much larger British Expeditionary Force 
for instruction, supply, and guidance. The relationship between the two armies was 
fraught with difficulty and cultural misunderstandings due in large measure to a 
very different reading of their joint campaign against Napoleon in the Peninsular 
War, fought a century earlier. The British desire to correct the CEP’s shortcomings 
was interpreted within the CEP as a desire to subjugate the Portuguese and to take 
credit for whatever they might accomplish on the battlefield. 
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Resumo 
 
O envio do Corpo Expedicionário Português (CEP) para França, em 1917, 
representou, para a corrente intervencionista portuguesa, a afirmação do desejo 
nacional de recuperar um papel independente na cena mundial, libertando Portugal 
da influência britânica. Porém, o CEP dependia da Força Expedicionária Britânica, 
muito maior do que ele, para a sua instrução, abastecimento e liderança. A relação 
entre os dois exércitos ficou marcada por dificuldades várias e desentendimentos 
culturais que resultavam em parte de leituras diferentes da campanha comum, um 
século antes, contra Napoleão, durante a Guerra Peninsular. O desejo britânico de 
corrigir os defeitos do CEP foi interpretado no seio deste como uma vontade de 
subjugar os Portugueses e ficar com os louros por eles conquistados no campo de 
batalha. 
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One of the most significant documents exchanged between the British and 
Portuguese governments during the First World War was the note addressed by Lord 
Derby, Secretary of State for War, to Norton de Matos, his Portuguese counterpart, on 8 
September 1917. Building on a series of reports on the state of the Corpo Expedicionário 
Português (CEP) that had made their way up the British chain of command over the course 
of that summer,2 the letter recommended that, in face of the coming winter, major changes 
be made to the plans for the CEP’s immediate future. Instead of aiming to have their two 
divisions fighting alongside each other as an independent army corps, the Portuguese, 
Derby argued, should place one division behind the other. The first would remain 
incorporated into a British army corps (as was still the case at the time of writing); the 
second would serve as a reserve and instruction unit, its brigades periodically exchanged 
with the ones at the front. The Commander of the CEP, General Tamagnini de Abreu, 
would stay on as an Inspector General of the force. Alongside this change to the agreed 
plans, and remembering “the glorious history of our two armies during the Peninsular War 
when British officers served under the Portuguese flag to the great advantage of both 
nations,” Derby suggested that an unspecified number of British officers be attached to 
Portuguese battalions and the corresponding non-infantry units. This, he explained, was 
essential to ensure “that unanimity of training and command that is so essential when two 
armies are so intimately linked in the face of the enemy as are ours” (MNE 1997: 196-198). 
This document elicited an angry response from Norton de Matos, who replied “with the 
rude frankness of a soldier” that it was “absolutely impossible” to agree with the hurtful 
proposals (MNE 1997: 202-203). The proposals were shelved, but only momentarily, being 
again put to the Portuguese after the December 1917 coup d’état which saw Sidónio Pais 
take power from the government of Afonso Costa. Eager for British recognition of his 
hold on power—and to escape the politically onerous obligation of sending more troops to 
France—Pais quickly agreed to the proposal.3 
The brief exchange between Derby and Norton de Matos highlights the very 
different way in which their two armies understood both their respective histories and their 
common enterprise in Flanders against the forces of Wilhelmine Germany. The purpose of 
this article is to explain the cultural assumptions on which the British model of cooperation 
with the Portuguese at the front rested, as well as to explore why these would have rankled 
																																								 																				
2 These are detailed later in the chapter. They include United Kingdom National Archive [NA], War Office 
[WO] 106/551, Sir Douglas Haig to Lord Derby, 27 August 1917; NA WO 106/551, Extracts from Report 
by G.O.C., XI Corps, R. Haking, 13 August 1917; and NA WO 106/551, Unsigned letter to Mackenzie 
(presumably General C.J. Mackenzie, commander of the 61st Division), 14 July 1917. 
3 NA WO 106/551, N. 702, Barnardiston to Whigham, 29 December 1917. 
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with the Portuguese interventionists in power until the December 1917 coup. The 
misunderstandings, which were evident from the moment the CEP landed in France, made 
more difficult the task of those who, aware of the Portuguese Army’s shortcomings, 
attempted to learn from the British in order to improve the CEP’s overall efficiency. They 
also meant that whatever goodwill existed among the British military authorities towards 
the Portuguese quickly evaporated in the face of what they took to be insufferable pride 
and stubbornness. The relationship between the British and Portuguese armies was unique 
in the context of the Western Front given the disproportion between the two forces and 
the need for one to instruct the other in the complexities of modern warfare. The tensions 
that arose were not like those that characterized the links between the French and British 
armies and, at a later stage, these two entities and their American counterpart.4 However, 
the two armies were not strangers to one another—or at least they did not believe 
themselves to be so—and it was that presumed understanding which, to a large extent, 
dictated how they approached and evaluated each other. Not surprisingly, World War I’s 
centenary commemorations have once more drawn the attention of Portuguese historians 
to the conflict. Rather than proposing a new field of exploration for historical research into 
Portugal’s participation in the Great War, as has been done in previous issues of this 
journal (see Vol. 15, n. 1 [2017] and Vol. 11, n. 2 [2013]), this article is suggesting a more 
nuanced reading of the single most important event to arise out of that participation—the 
constitution and dispatch of the CEP to France. This reading arises out of the side-by-side 
comparison of Portuguese and British primary sources. This author is by no means the 
only historian to have attempted this in the recent past, but the conclusions reached in 
recent studies employing this approach have been rather different (Telo and Sousa, 2016, 
Meneses 2018a). 
Upon receiving Derby’s missive, Norton de Matos consulted with General N.W. 
Barnardiston, the head of the British Military Mission in Portugal, who had been in Lisbon 
for over a year. Initially tasked, alongside a French officer, with assessing the state of the 
Portuguese Army—to see whether or not it was ready to take to the trenches—
Barnardiston had stayed on in Lisbon, continuing to report on local military matters to the 
War Office in London. In the meantime, a more junior officer, Lieutenant Colonel C. A. 
Ker, was appointed to head the British Military Mission to the CEP in France. Its job was 
																																								 																				
4 On the relationship between the armies of the major allies on the Western Front, see, for example, William J 
Philpott (1996), Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914-1918, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan; Elizabeth Greenhalgh (2005) Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France During the First World War, 
Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press; and Chris Kempshall (2018) British, French and American Relations 
on the Western Front, 1914-1918, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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to assist the Portuguese forces that arrived in France to acquire the skills necessary to be 
entrusted with a portion, however small, of the front lines. Ker reported to General Sir 
Richard Haking, who commanded XI Army Corps into which the CEP would initially be 
inserted. For these British officers, professional soldiers with a long service record that 
stretched back well beyond 1914, Wellington’s campaign in the Iberian Peninsula 
represented the pinnacle of British continental soldiering. In the war against Napoleon, as 
they well knew, Wellington’s force had contained a very significant Portuguese component. 
In 1809-10, as was now taking place in 1916-17, it had been found necessary to modernize 
the Portuguese army in a hurry and under fire. The first time around, the Portuguese, in the 
face of their recent defeat to Spain in 1801 and the subsequent failure to halt Junot’s 
invading army, had asked for a British general to be placed in charge of their army. London 
sent them William Beresford, who, co-opted with the rank of marshal, quickly set to work. 
He acquired a fearsome reputation as a strict disciplinarian and ruffled local feathers by 
appointing a number of British officers to key positions within the force he now headed. 
Believing the situation in 1917 to be comparable, officers like Barnardiston, Ker, and 
Haking understood their task to be similar to Beresford’s and expected the Portuguese to 
see matters in the same light. When they did not do so, baulking at too great a British 
interference in what they saw as internal Portuguese affairs, relations quickly soured, 
damaging the prospect of a positive contribution by the CEP to the fighting in France. 
Always a topic of interest to a British readership, specialized or otherwise, the 
Peninsular War was the subject of a number of works published as its centenary was 
commemorated in the years that preceded the First World War. All of these naturally paid 
considerable attention to Marshal Beresford’s efforts. Ever since W. F. P. Napier’s History of 
the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, published in the 1820s, Beresford had been 
regarded as a poor tactician but a great organizer. This is still how he was portrayed by 
Alexander Innes Shand in his Wellington’s Lieutenants, published in 1902. Shand presented 
what was, all things considered, a positive view of Wellington’s Portuguese allies, although 
they had needed, he explained, Beresford’s impartiality, single-mindedness, and harshness 
to literally whip them into line: 
 
His task was both difficult and invidious. But he had to work on excellent 
materials, although demoralised and disorganised […] The Portuguese had 
made him marshal, and military master he meant to be. For a time he was 
the most unpopular man in the country, but he held steadily to his course 
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through stress and storm. Ere long he had his reward in the national 
gratitude, and the soldiers he literally lashed into obedience after a hard-
fought field became his admirers. Yet, though they feared and respected, 
they never loved him, for he carried relentless severities to an excess (Shand 
1902: 245-247). 
 
According to Shand, Beresford had faced considerable difficulties: an army in chaos; a 
professional caste of officers who “regularly drew pay but scrupulously neglected their 
duties” (Shand 1902: 245); a corrupt and inefficient government; and resistance to his 
reliance on imported British officers, who were lured into Portuguese service by the 
guarantee of instant promotion. 
A similar but more authoritative verdict was delivered by Charles Oman, whose 
seven-volume History of the Peninsular War was interrupted in its publication by the First 
World War, during which time Oman participated in the official British propaganda effort. 
In 1912, Oman also published Wellington’s Army: 1809-1814, in which he reminded readers 
of the importance of the Portuguese to Wellington’s success: a full two-fifths of 
Wellington’s army had been Portuguese. Naturally, then, Oman focused on Beresford’s 
efforts, being greatly appreciative of them:  
 
[…] he did most eminent service in creating order out of chaos, and 
produced in the short space of a year a well-disciplined force that was 
capable of taking a creditable part in line with the British army, and won 
well-deserved encomiums from Wellington and every other fair critic for 
the part it took at Bussaco, its first engagement (Oman 1912: 119).  
 
Like Shand, but in greater detail, Oman stressed the obstacles Beresford had been 
forced to overcome in order to create a battle-ready army. These arose not so much, as 
might be expected in an era of social darwinism and imperial arrogance, from the nature of 
the Portuguese as a people,5 but rather from the corrupt and corrupting atmosphere and 
regime which he believed prevailed in Lisbon in the early years of the 19th Century.6 As 
																																								 																				
5 On Darwin’s impact on existing theories of race, see Bethencourt (2013), 290-306. 
6 This is not to dismiss the very significant literature on the subject of “martial races”—a concept which the 
Portuguese military authorities themselves bought into. Nevertheless, while it is entirely possible that British 
officers saw their Portuguese allies through the racial prism, the sources consulted, written during and after 
the war, concentrate instead on cultural and historical differences. On Portuguese use of the “martial races” 
concept see, for example, Colonel E. A. Azambuja Martins (1936) O Soldado Africano de Moçambique, 
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Oman put it, “The Portuguese Army before 1808 had all the typical faults of an army of 
the ancient regime which had rusted in a long period of peace” (Oman 1912: 231). Beresford 
had been forced to dismiss “scores of incapable officers—many of them fidalgos with great 
court influence” (Oman 1912: 120) in order to make room for “young and unknown men” 
of greater merit. British officers helped overcome these difficulties, instilling greater 
professionalism and compelling patriotic and proud Portuguese to emulate them. 
Meanwhile, the army was not allowed to operate on its own; instead, its brigades, once 
assembled, disciplined, and trained, were distributed among Wellington’s divisions. Only 
later in the war would the Portuguese authorities, desirous of greater international 
recognition for their efforts, hold out—without success—for a distinct force operating in 
the field under Portuguese command. According to Oman, the results of Beresford’s 
efforts were visible when, for the first time, the newly refurbished Portuguese units faced 
the French at Bussaco (or Buçaco) in 1810, fighting alongside their British comrades 
against Masséna’s invading force: 
 
The Portuguese line, indeed, had done their fair half of the fighting, as the 
return showed—in no instance with discredit, in some with high merit. If 
the 8th and 9th Portuguese had broken before Foy’s attack, it was under 
severe stress, and when attacked by superior numbers. On the other hand, 
Pack’s brigade, Coleman’s 19th, and the Caçadores of the Light Division 
won the highest praise from their commanders, and had taken a most 
distinguished part in the victory. (Oman 1908: 384) 
 
In 1917, the lesson to be drawn from these works, as well as those that Shand and Oman 
had drawn upon (Halliday 1812: 275-280), was simple: the Portuguese, having entered the 
war, could make a positive contribution to the ongoing struggle against Germany but they 
would have to accept a high level of British supervision and even involvement in their 
military affairs. In other words, they would have to sacrifice the propaganda value of a fully 
independent force in order to leave a true mark on the conflict. Everyone knew that the 
CEP was not ready to go immediately into the trenches as it arrived in France: the 
Portuguese army had not faced a European opponent since 1814 and the nature of war had 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
Lisbon: Agência Geral das Colónias, 19-32. On the wider international debate see, for example, David Omissi 
(1994) The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940, Basingstoke: Macmillan; David Killingray, 
“Introduction,” in David Killingray and David Omissi (eds) (1999) Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the 
Colonial Powers c.1700-1964, Manchester: Manchester University Press; and Heather Streets (2004), The Military, 
Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1957-1914, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
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changed extraordinarily even since the start of the present conflict. It was therefore agreed 
that a period of training and adaptation would be required in France, although there was 
less consensus around the question of who should administer the training. The Portuguese 
wanted the British to train Portuguese instructors, who would in turn train their own 
troops. For their part, the British believed that only they could and should carry out this 
job and, what is more, that their efforts would be welcomed by the Portuguese, aware not 
only of the contribution they had made to the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte a century 
earlier but also of the importance of Beresford’s efforts in helping them to do so. This 
time, the Portuguese won. Given the scale of the manpower shortage faced by the Allies in 
the wake of Verdun and the Somme, the Portuguese government’s enthusiasm for the 
conflict seemed to guarantee a potentially important source of soldiers; there was no a priori 
dismissal of their potential contribution to the allied cause. 
British expectations, however, clashed with the mindset of Portuguese 
interventionism. For Portuguese interventionists, the war was a unique opportunity to 
achieve a number of goals. These included the securing of Portugal’s overseas colonies, the 
domestic strengthening of the regime, and, crucially, for the purposes of this article, the 
emergence of Portugal from the shadow of Great Britain so as to pursue its own path in 
the world. There were also frequent mentions of the need to improve relations with other 
countries, notably Spain and Brazil. João Chagas, perhaps the most determined of 
Portuguese interventionists, was extraordinarily explicit in his diaries when it came to 
Portugal’s relations with Britain; as he put it in the first days of the conflict, “Portugal does 
not understand that it is now or never the time to make up for its past as a protégé of 
England and to be its ally, to be somebody” (Chagas 1986: 128). Sometime later he would 
go further, writing, 
 
Portugal’s enemy in this war is England. It would be most convenient for 
England if Portugal were to have, at this time, no personality, as was the 
case in Napoleon’s time. We must fight this objective, affirming, even if 
against her will, our personality. Our participation in this war has but one 
objective: To survive against the English. But this cannot be stated in the 
newspapers. (Chagas 1986a: 276-277) 
 
This desire for freedom from British interference, although impossible to realize, was part 
of the Portuguese war effort from the start. In a comprehensive interview granted to 
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journalist João de Barros for the Luso-Brazilian review Atlântida after his return from long 
negotiations in London, Afonso Costa denied that the Portuguese would be inserted into 
the overall British war effort. The Portuguese army would have its own sector, its own 
command structure, and “complete autonomy:” 
 
The Portuguese army, within the confines of its sector, will enjoy perfect 
independence. It will be subordinated only to whatever arrangements are 
reached between its General Staff and those of the allies. You cannot 
imagine how pleased I was, as a Portuguese and as a republican, by this 
compliment, made in advance, to my country’s army and to its reputation 
for extreme bravery. (Barros 1916: 1000) 
 
For this reason, Article 2 of the Anglo-Portuguese Convention regarding the CEP stated 
that the unit would operate “subject to tactical considerations, always as a whole under the 
command of a Portuguese General” (MNE 1997: 108-112). Although the officer corps was 
by no means uniformly republican or even interventionist, there was a core of 
interventionist officers grouped around the CEP’s General Staff and its leader, Major (later 
Lieutenant Colonel) Roberto Baptista. Like Norton de Matos, Baptista was a recent convert 
to the republican creed but had made up for lost time since 1910 and was generally 
identified as one of the “Young Turks;” those professional officers who rallied to 
Democratic party leader Afonso Costa and pursued his agenda within the armed forces. 
Having already been designated Chief of Staff of the CEP’s predecessor—the “Instruction 
Division” which had assembled in 1916 at Tancos, in central Portugal, in order to 
demonstrate to the Allies that Portugal had a force ready to send into the field of battle—
Baptista was the spear tip of Portuguese interventionism. Above and beyond his duties as 
the CEP’s Chief of Staff, it was Baptista’s responsibility to ensure that the campaign in 
France met the Portuguese government’s political needs. To that end, he engaged in private 
correspondence with the government in Lisbon that bypassed the normal chain of 
command and that allowed him to report on the political evolution of the unit.7 Tamagnini 
would only learn of this correspondence when confronted with its existence after Sidónio 
Pais’s coup, carried out in December 1917. Others who engaged in this practice belonged 
to the handful of members of parliament serving in the CEP. They too felt imbued with 
																																								 																				
7 On the intrigue affecting the CEP’s higher echelons and Roberto Baptista’s role, see António José Telo and 
Pedro Marquês de Sousa (2016) O CEP. Os Militares Sacrificados pela Má Política, Oporto: Fronteira do Caos, 
207-217. 
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the need to pursue the interventionists’ diplomatic objective, whatever the cost to military 
discipline. 
Chagas’s words make clear that for the culturally Francophile and historically 
Anglophobe (notably in the wake of the 1890 British ultimatum over southern Africa) 
Portuguese republicans who seized power in 1910, the Peninsular War was a profoundly 
problematic period. Undoubtedly a popular war (an argument could even be made for it 
being a total war, given the impact of Wellington’s scorched-earth tactics on the civilian 
population) fought to drive out a thrice-invading force from home soil, it was also conflict 
fought for Crown and Church against France and the ideals of the Revolution of 1789. It 
seemed to republicans that the one hero that emerged from this period was General 
Gomes Freire de Andrade, sentenced to death for his part in a liberal conspiracy (designed 
in part to send Beresford, still in place after the war’s end, home) after his return to 
Portugal from France, where he had served Napoleon. He was, in other words, a martyr for 
freedom whose very career during this period highlighted just how hard it had been to 
identify where the national interest lay—was it with the people against republican ideals or 
with those who had fought alongside Napoleon against Portugal’s allies? 
However, the sense of injustice that permeated the Portuguese army regarding the 
way it had been treated a century earlier (and the way in which the Peninsular War was still 
remembered, notably in Great Britain) was not restricted within the army to Afonso 
Costa’s “Young Turks.” The Revista Militar, Portugal’s leading military publication, had 
naturally been marking the centenary of Wellington’s six-year campaign. While not refusing 
to pay homage to the great commander, its contributors stressed the importance of 
Portugal’s part in his successes, in the process explaining why it was that British officers 
had played such an important role in the modernization of the army. For example, in a 
series of articles which began in August 1908, Major Adriano Beça explained that it was a 
British suggestion that had led the Portuguese royal family to leave Portugal for Brazil in 
1808, allowing for the country’s conquest by Junot’s pauperized army without a shot being 
fired (Beça 1908: 550-552). This decision led in turn to the dismantlement of the existing 
Portuguese army and the incorporation of some of its finest officers into Napoleon’s 
military as part of the Portuguese Legion that served as far afield as Russia: 
 
Generals such as the Marquis of Alorna, Gomes Freire and Pamplona, 
colonels Pego and Álvaro Xavier das Póvoas, among others, were officers 
capable of rivalling in merit, if not actually exceeding, the English generals 
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that served Wellington. With these men and a strong government, such as 
we had under Pombal, commanding the resources needed to keep 60 or 
70,000 men under arms, we could have foregone Beresford and the English 
officers who aided him in the reorganization of the Portuguese army. (Beça 
1908: 554) 
 
What is more, the British, when negotiating the August 1808 convention of Sintra, which 
marked the end of the first French invasion of Portugal, should have demanded—and as 
the Portuguese wanted them to do—the return of the Portuguese Legion in return for 
allowing the departure from Portugal, aboard British ships, of Junot’s defeated force (Beça 
1908: 554). Finally, Beça claimed that the officers who did shine during the actual fighting 
in the Peninsula were first sidelined by Beresford and then ignored by British chroniclers 
and historians of the campaign (Beça 1908: 555; 1910: 752). It was important, then, to 
remember and celebrate the Portuguese contribution to the allied victory as part of the 
centenary commemorations, rescuing the memory and reputation of officers and soldiers 
alike (Beça 1909: 85-94). It should be noted that British authors from Napier to Oman 
were regularly cited in these Portuguese articles—they were by no means ignored by 
Portuguese military historians who thought their verdicts flawed as they were based on an 
incomplete analysis. 
In his reply to Lord Derby, Norton de Matos stressed that cooperation with the 
British during the Peninsular Wars was not, as the British seemed to think, the pinnacle of 
Portugal’s military tradition; his letter included a pointed reference to the Portuguese 
Legion and the way it singled out for praise by Napoleon during the retreat from Russia. 
General Barnardiston, increasingly aware of the emotionally charged nature of this 
question, urged caution on all sides. For the benefit of General Sir R. D. Whigham, Deputy 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Barnardiston explained that “the centenary of the so-
called ‘martyrdom’ of Portuguese ‘patriot,’ General Gomes Freire de Andrade, who was 
executed by Beresford for conspiracy in 1817 is just about to be celebrated.”8 Addressing 
the inclusion of British officers in Portuguese units, Norton de Matos added that “the 
principle adopted during the Peninsular War has left most unpleasant memories in 
Portugal;” reproducing such a step would lead to “violent opposition.” Less than three 
weeks after writing this letter—at a moment when both the President of the Republic, 
Bernardino Machado, and the Prime Minister, Afonso Costa, were visiting the front lines in 
																																								 																				
8 NA WO 106/551, N. 487, Barnardiston to Whigham, 28 September 1917.  
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France—Norton de Matos led the Freire de Andrade centenary celebrations in the town of 
Oeiras. Three other ministers were present alongside a deputation from Lisbon’s municipal 
chamber, delegations from all the military units in the Lisbon garrison, police forces, and 
local schools; according to the press, only the incessant rain kept a larger crowd away. A 
military band played the national anthem as Norton de Matos unveiled a plaque on the 
already existing monument to Freire de Andrade, which read, “To Gomes Freire de 
Andrade. First centenary of this death, 18-10-1917. An homage by the Portuguese 
people.”9 
The stage was set, then, for confrontation in France between two contradictory 
goals: on the one hand, the British desire to take the CEP in hand and mold it into a force 
ready to defend a sector of the front line, in accordance with what was generally believed to 
have happened over a century earlier; on the other hand, the Portuguese determination to 
shake off British tutelage and demonstrate to the world that Portugal now stood on its own 
two feet as an equal among the allied nations. Years later, Ker, now a Major General 
stationed in India, was consulted by Brigadier J. E. Edmonds, author of the British Army’s 
official history of the war, over the course of the battle of La Lys in April 1918. Ker 
suggested a number of alterations to Edmonds’s original draft, which he deemed too 
hurtful to the Portuguese. In a highly revealing comment he noted, “I want to avoid the 
possibility of ill-feeling being aroused among the Portuguese, especially now that it is 
becoming ancient history. Their feeling against us after the Peninsular War was very acute, 
far more so than we ever realized until 1917.”10 Ker and the other officers who had to deal 
with the Portuguese may have realized that this sentiment existed, but they did not act on it 
when first confronted with its manifestation; the task at hand—readying the CEP for the 
trenches—came first. However, their attempts to force the Portuguese to conform were 
resisted, which led to mounting frustration, but this was not a clash of equals and there 
could really be only one winner. This was so for a number of very powerful reasons. First 
of all, as has been mentioned, the CEP was by no means unanimous in its political 
viewpoints. Not all officers and men were republicans and among those who were, not all 
set off for France with the same understanding of Britain’s role in Portuguese history. This 
was especially true of its commanding officer, General Tamagnini de Abreu, who was 
generally well-disposed towards his British colleagues and endeavored to cooperate when 
and where possible. Tamagnini may have been outflanked by men like Baptista or the many 
																																								 																				
9 A Capital, 18 October 1917. 
10 NA Cabinet (CAB) 45/124, letter, Ker to Edmonds, 30 December 1931. 
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members of parliament who joined the CEP—and who like the CEP’s chief of staff had a 
direct line of communication with those in power in Lisbon—but he remained in 
command of the CEP and had to be obeyed. The same also held for General Gomes da 
Costa who commanded the 1st Division until April 1918, switching to the 2nd Division 
when it alone was left in the trenches (just in time to face the 9 April German offensive). A 
distinction was regularly drawn by the British between these two senior officers and 
Baptista, who they began to demonize. Secondly, of course, the CEP was in the British 
sector and had to play by British rules. It depended on the British army for most of its 
supplies and even for the pay of soldiers and men (Telo and Sousa 2016: 196-198), Portugal 
running an enormous tab for its participation on the Western Front. Although there was a 
convention between the two countries setting out the relationship between their armies, the 
CEP was under the orders first of General Haking and later, when it finally constituted an 
army corps, of General Horne, Commander of the British First Army. The notion of a 
‘Portuguese front’ was very much an illusion. Finally, the Portuguese were dependent on 
the British for the communications between Lisbon and the CEP. Troops and materials 
were carried mostly on British ships convoyed by British destroyers; should this lifeline be 
cut, the CEP would be generally left to its own devices. This, of course, is exactly what 
happened in the fall of 1917. 
The unit diary of the British Mission to the CEP provides us with a glimpse of this 
evolving conflict. After an initial first contact with a batch of Portuguese officers—
including Baptista—which seems to have gone well, the First Army issued a letter stating 
that “Details as to training will be arranged direct between XI Corps and Lieut. Col. Ker, 
CMG, DSO, Commanding British Mission attached Portuguese Division.”11 A footnote, 
however, indicated that “This paragraph was amended on the 14th Feb. to read: ‘Details as 
to training will be arranged by XIth Corps.’ This was the result of representations from the 
Portuguese, who, for political reasons, wished to keep the mission in the background. 
CAK.” Baptista had returned to France resolved to do battle with Ker and scored some 
early points. The truth was that the Convention regulating the CEP’s existence made no 
mention of the Mission, a unilateral British initiative. The Mission’s diary contains extracts 
from a letter addressed by Ker to Major General Anderson, of the First Army’s Chief of 
Staff, revealing that the former now found himself in a quandary:  
 
																																								 																				
11 NA WO 95/5488, 6 June 1917. 
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[…] by the terms of the convention there should be no more British 
Officers attached to the Portuguese. At the same time, Burnett Stuart told 
me when I was appointed here, that G.H.Q. considered it essential that 
there should be a British Mission attached to the Portuguese, and that we 
were to make ourselves indispensable to them and tactfully help as much as 
possible.12  
 
Baptista had returned from Lisbon saying that, according to his Government, the Mission 
could exist provided it was restricted to the CEP’s headquarters—"half a gain, but […] not 
as complete a gain as we would like.” More to the point, however, Portuguese Brigade 
Majors were not willing to take advice from their British counterparts “and until they do 
so, we shan’t progress much.” Baptista had also prevented the sending of “British Officer 
interpreters” to every Portuguese battalion; they were to be permitted only at Brigade and 
Regimental HQs. Ker fumed. On the one hand, training was slow and hampered by the 
host of diseases affecting both the Portuguese and the cattle they had brought to France. 
On the other hand, British officers could not give orders to their Portuguese colleagues, 
only make suggestions: “My Officers are working like beavers, but find it hard to make 
bricks with their hands tied.” He was sure of two things: that the Portuguese wanted “to 
get rid of us all,” and that—as he added in a post-scriptum—"there is a hidden strand of 
barbed wire in the fence somewhere, and I’m sure it’s chiefly political.” 
Horne’s reply was, for the moment, equivocal; Ker met Anderson on 18 February 
and was told that “The Army Commander quite understands the situation and says he 
wants you to continue to go very slow.”13 “Slow” was the operative word; the training of 
the CEP seemed to make little progress, so much so that it began to exasperate the British 
authorities. In these early days, both Ker and the Mission continued to suffer setbacks. On 
20 February, Ker met Haking who confirmed that “in future all orders would be sent direct 
from the Corps to the Portuguese, and not through the British Mission as hitherto.” This 
meant that “the status of the British Mission thus becomes changed as greater 
responsibility falls upon the Corps.”14 On 6 March, Ker wrote Haking, sending a copy to a 
colleague in the First Army’s General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Mackenzie. He 
highlighted a number of the problems faced by the Portuguese so far, including disease, the 
																																								 																				
12 NA WO 95/5488, 18 February 1917, appendix 1. 
13 NA WO 95/5488, 18 February 1917, appendix 1. 
14 NA WO 95/5488, 20 February 1917. 
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poor quality of the uniforms, lack of discipline among all ranks, dilatoriness (which he 
identified as “the national characteristic”), over-centralization (without the express approval 
of either Tamagnini or Baptista nothing seemed to happen), the lack of aptitude of the 
officers for command, and the inability of the staff to look after the needs of the force. Ker 
vented his spleen. One the one hand, “neither Officers nor men, as a whole, realise the 
conditions of modern warfare;” on the other, “they are quite unaware of their own 
shortcomings,” and resented any interference. Given the lengthy list of problems besetting 
the force, Ker could see only one really efficient solution: “to place British Officers in 
command of formations, substituting British for Portuguese Staff Officers as was done in 
the Peninsular War.” This, he recognized, was politically impossible; as a result, it was 
necessary to widen the scope and reach of the Mission’s task. Instead of just training 
Portuguese instructors, the British would have to undertake the training of the whole 
Portuguese force as well as oversee discipline in training areas; they should also send 
Portuguese units, great and small, to the front for temporary attachment to larger British 
forces as soon as they were ready.15  
Not surprisingly, two days later a major conference was held between Haking and 
other senior officers of XI Corps, Tamagnini, Baptista, and other Portuguese officers, and 
members of the British Mission.16 Haking ruled that British officers involved in training 
could not simply wait until they were consulted by their Portuguese counterparts; they 
“should make suggestions to the Portuguese Officers as to the best methods of training 
and point out mistakes which were being made.” Haking also ruled on Ker’s role going 
forward: 
 
Colonel Ker is in charge of all the British Officers in the Mission and will 
see that they carry out their duties as decided upon above by the Corps 
Commander and General Tamagnini. He will act as a liaison officer 
between General Tamagnini and his staff and the Corps Commander and 
his Staff. He will bring to the notice of General Tamagnini of his Chief of 
Staff Officer anything he thinks requires special attention or alteration, and 
he will do everything in his power to ensure that he and the officers of the 
British Mission do their utmost to help the Portuguese officers and men, 
																																								 																				
15 NA WO 95/5488, 6 March 1917, Appendix 2. 
16 NA WO 158/850, “Notes of a conference held at Aire on 8th March 1917, but the General Officer 
Commanding XI Corps at the Headquarters of the British Mission attached to the Portuguese Expeditionary 
Force.” Note that this conference has been mentioned by other authors. 
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without in any way interfering with the responsible chain of the Portuguese 
command and control. 
 
The meeting went some way towards clearing the air, emboldening British Mission officers 
to make suggestions, but their advice was not always acted on and centralization remained 
an issue: 
 
Major Baptista has more on his shoulders than any one man can possibly 
carry. His decisions are always so framed that they keep everything 
centralised, instead of giving subordinates power to help themselves […] he 
falls back on the argument that he knows the limitations of his own people, 
and that is a very difficult argument to answer.17 
 
This article cannot provide a comprehensive overview of the CEP’s preparation for battle 
or even of Anglo-Portuguese relations on the battlefield. The unit’s training, analyzed at 
every step by its British minders, continued and eventually its men began to rotate in and 
out of the trenches they would be called on to defend, first as companies, then as 
battalions, and, finally, as brigades. British criticism of the CEP, as this process evolved, 
focused above all on the role played by officers and their apparent lack of concern for the 
other ranks, which manifested itself in a variety of problematic ways. This attitude, so 
different from the paternalism that informed the relations between officers and their men 
in the British Army (Watson 2008: 114-124),  was corroborated by important Portuguese 
sources. What seems clear, however, is that the inbuilt defensiveness of the Portuguese, 
hyper-dependent on British resources but keen to distance themselves from London, and 
the growing frustration of the British in the face of what they took to be pointless 
obstructionism prevented the CEP from achieving the goals set for it be its political 
masters. By the late spring 1917, the Portuguese government had begun to send units 
destined for a second division when it was informed that the ships put at its disposal for 
that purpose were being withdrawn by Britain. This was a crisis of the first order and 
Norton de Matos set off for London to resolve it. He met en route with Sir Douglas Haig 
on 20 May. Haig, five days earlier, had informed Derby of the CEP’s progress, which he 
believed to be “unduly slow.”18 It would require another month’s preparation before being 
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18 WO 158/114, Haig to the Secretary, War Office, Secret, 15 May 1917. 
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able to defend—under constant supervision—a quiet sector of the line. The Portuguese 
suffered from over-centralization, “very indifferent interior economy,” poor “horse 
management,” and the indifference of junior officers for the welfare of the men. It was also 
the case that many officers, especially senior ones, 
 
regarded our army as composed mainly of amateurs from whom they had 
nothing to learn except a few details of trench warfare. They were unduly 
and needlessly jealous of their national independence and unwilling to make 
full use of the specially selected officers of the British Mission […]. 
 
When the two men met, Haig thought Norton de Matos “quite an energetic and keen little 
man.”19 Haig noted in his diary how slowly the CEP was being prepared for service and 
singled out Baptista, “who has made difficulties and would not take advantage of the 
knowledge of the British officers whom I sent to the division as instructors.” During the 
meeting, Haig suggested that Baptista should be returned to Portugal. Norton de Matos, 
however, played for time by promising “to go into the matter” and to spend some time 
with the CEP on his return from London. But Baptista, who went with the Minister to 
London, stayed on with the CEP and this episode cannot but have soured Haig’s view of 
the unit. A very explicit request for the removal of an officer from a key position had been 
ignored. 
Derby’s letter, quoted at the start of this article, was based on a missive, dated 27 
August, in which Haig expressed great anxiety at the prospect of a Portuguese army corps 
holding a stretch of the front line.20 His first solution was to simply remove them, sending 
them home or to another theatre of operations; his second was to post “a proportion of 
British officers to the various units to control and supervise their training, and actually to 
assume command in battle, as was done in the Peninsula;” his third was to prevent the 
creation of an army corps, by—as Derby would go on to suggest—keeping one division as 
a training and reserve force. Haig’s views on the matter were largely shaped by a lengthy 
report produced by Haking on 13 August on the subject of the CEP. In it, Haking 
explained that only by his constant supervision was the Portuguese division kept in any sort 
of fighting form. At the heart of the matter was the poor quality of the officers. Some were 
good and Haking singled out two battalions for praise (Infantry 34 and 28) but the rest 
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were poor, as were the NCOs; the morale of the force, he thought, was weak, and it would 
break if attacked “simply for want of good leaders.” Haking expressed the wish that the 
Convention could be overruled so as to place a British officer “in temporary command of 
all units teaching the corresponding Portuguese Officers their duty and making them do 
it.” Only then would it be possible to extract the best performance from the CEP’s “not at 
all bad soldiers.” Such shortcomings were evident in the Staff as well, whose members were 
“tarred with the political brush.” Exceedingly secretive and bureaucratic, they systematically 
opposed British wishes, many of them belonging “to a secret political society.” Baptista 
added, “If this Officer could be removed to a sphere where his political proclivities could 
be more usefully employed by his country I know that both the G[eneral] O[fficer] 
C[ommanding] CEP and the GOC 1st Portuguese Division would be very pleased.” 
Many of the British complaints about the CEP were, it seems, well-founded (Telo 
and Sousa 2016, Meneses 2018a, passim). The British Mission produced report after report 
on the various units that made up the expeditionary force, detailing their shortcomings as 
well as the improvements being registered. Its members also singled out individual 
Portuguese officers for praise—not all were tarred with the same brush. Their criticism was 
matched by other criticisms found in Portuguese sources. Tamagnini’s memoirs are full of 
complaints about the attitude and aptitude of his subordinates and their anti-British 
sentiment, motivated, in part, because of the widespread belief that it was Britain’s fault 
that Portugal was at war and that they now found themselves in France (Pereira (ed.) 2004: 
ccxx). As far as Tamagnini was concerned, the officers who best performed their duties 
were those who bore the British no ill-will (Pereira (ed.) 2004: ccxxi). Tamagnini, echoing 
Haig’s view, also stressed how the Staff officers gathered around Baptista, as well as other 
politicized elements, and repeatedly questioned their British counterparts’ military 
knowledge: before the war, they insinuated, the British had been totting up numbers in 
banks or selling butter behind a counter (Pereira (ed.) 2004: clxxix). Incredibly, one such 
officer, Lieutenant Colonel Freiria, would, at a lecture in Lisbon’s Escola Militar in 1918, pin 
the blame for trench warfare on the British army, whose small professional core had been 
decimated in 1914 and who had thus gone underground; replacement officers lacking the 
technical knowledge and even the offensive spirit necessary to continue the fight above 
ground. As he put it, “an army built for the trench and which had always fought in the 
trench, will only launch itself with the greatest of difficulties, of its own volition, into a War 
of Movement” (Freiria 1918: 8-9). In consequence of his conversation with Haig in May 
and subsequent time in London, Norton de Matos wrote Tamagnini, urging him to step up 
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the promotions to officers from the ranks and expressing the view that “not enough work 
was being done, that many officers lacked interest” or viewed their time in France as an 
exile or a punishment that would cease once the government had been removed from 
power (Pereira (ed.) 2004: cxxxvi-cxxxvii). He was not the only interventionist to have doubts 
about the army sent to France; João Chagas would write, some months later, after the 
battle of La Lys: 
 
The mentality of our officers, their total lack of self-sacrifice and desire to 
fight, the germanophile tendencies of many, combined with the situation in 
Portugal and the sidonista reaction against the war lead me to very 
pessimistic conclusions. (Chagas 1986b: 49)  
 
There was one last opportunity, as the British saw it, to exercise pressure on the Portuguese 
decision-makers to reform the CEP, accepting its limitations and recognizing the need for 
greater British participation. This occurred in October when President Bernardino 
Machado and Prime Minister Afonso Costa visited the front shortly before the 2nd Division 
joined the 1st in the trenches, bringing to life a Portuguese army corps. As General Sir R. D. 
Whigham, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, wrote in a letter to Barnardiston, 
“We have the Portuguese President over here now, and I hope something satisfactory will 
be settled.”21 Machado met with Haig on 17 October 1917, the latter raising his long-
standing concerns with the quality of the CEP’s officers. Machado—"an alert little man of 
66 years of age,” as Haig called him—generally agreed with Haig, explaining that this was a 
consequence of Portugal’s long decline, which the Republic was trying to reverse: 
 
The President assured me that the Revolution was the result of the national 
desire that Portugal should take its place in the world. The majority of the 
former ruling classes were effete and thought only of amusement. I told 
him that the weak part of the Portuguese division in France was the 
officers. He said we must train others from the young soldiers. I agreed that 
was the only thing to do, but we must have his support. 
 
Machado and Costa, for their part, painted a picture of a postwar world in which the 
Atlantic would be dominated by the English and Portuguese-speaking powers: “Brazil is to 
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America what Portugal is to England. All four, said the President, must co-operate closely 
after the war.”22  
The notion of promoting officers from the ranks was, however, a mirage; 
Portugal’s illiteracy rate of 70%, unique in Western Europe made candidates for this kind 
of promotion unusually difficult to find. What Haig meant as a precise criticism about the 
CEP, republicans took to be encouragement for their grandiose project of national 
affirmation and renewal—both, it seemed to them, had a common enemy in the shape of 
reactionary officers. This is unsurprising, not least because, as João Chagas put it, of the 
evident ill-will towards Machado and Costa of the officers in France. At the Laventie train 
station, Chagas recognized only three officers known for their republican sentiment 
(Chagas 1986b: 47-48). The words of Machado and Costa made little impact at the end of 
the day, however, since, shortly after their return to Lisbon, the decision was taken in 
London to withdraw the last British ship ensuring the transport of reinforcements in men 
and animals to the CEP just as it was set to establish itself as an independent army corps, 
with the 1st and 2nd Divisions side-by-side in the trenches.23  
Within a month of this decision being taken, Machado was in exile and Costa 
behind bars, power having been seized in Lisbon by Sidónio Pais, who initially took on the 
role of Prime Minister, Minister of War, and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Meeting Pais on 
18 December, Barnardiston mentioned Lord Derby’s approach to Norton de Matos, 
explaining that it “might to a great extent relieve the Portuguese Government from the 
necessity of sending such large reinforcements as were at present required.” Barnardiston 
also reiterated Haig’s concerns “for the health and efficiency of the Portuguese Troops in 
the trenches during the winter.”24 Before the year was out, Pais had acquiesced to the 
proposals. Not only did this signify withdrawing one division from the front, it also meant 
posting British liaison officers (of a rank no higher than Captain) to the CEP’s battalions 
and similar-sized units (there being some haziness as to the precise contours of their 
respective briefs).25 Where Pais drew the line was in abolishing the CEP’s corps command. 
Not surprisingly, interventionists were now in retreat. There was a clear-out in the CEP; 
Baptista was soon sent recalled, meeting Chagas—who had resigned his position but stayed 
on in Paris—in the French capital (Chagas 1986b: 5). Baptista was replaced by João José 
																																								 																				
22 National Archives, Diaries of Sir Douglas Haig, Wednesday 17 October 1917. 
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Sinel de Cordes, who years later would mastermind the 28 May 1926 coup that overthrew 
the First Republic. Freiria too was replaced. However, the manpower crisis hitting the 
British in the wake of the battle of Passchendaele meant that the CEP’s two divisions were 
forced to remain on the front line until April 1918; only then was 1st Division removed 
from the trenches, the 2nd being incorporated into Haking’s XI Corps after which it was 
decided to remove the 2nd as well. This was due to happen on the night of 9-10 April but 
never took place given the German assault which ocurred on the 9th.  
After the fighting on 9 April 1918, known in Portugal as the battle of La Lys, the 
British took measures to ensure that what remained of the CEP in France was neither 
reinforced nor meaningfully reorganized (Meneses 2018b). The brigades of the 1st Division 
and the survivors of the 2nd were distributed among British divisions to work on building 
and repairing rear defenses. Artillery units were also distributed among British forces; 
retaining their primary function, they were, however, separated. Only in the very last days 
of the war (and after a number of very serious mutinies) were some infantry battalions 
returned to the trenches, again parceled out to various British brigades. An enormous 
opportunity had been lost. Interventionists had failed to raise Portugal’s prestige and had 
actually imperiled the survival of the republican regime that had arisen out of the October 
1910 revolution. Under the guise of restoring the Republic to its purity, Sidónio Pais 
moved Portuguese politics very far from democratic ideals before his murder in December 
1918 allowed for the reestablishment of constitutional order. At the front, the Portuguese 
war effort, which had promised so much and had shown itself capable of enthusing a 
Portuguese readership around the globe (Meneses 2017: 3), was snuffed out by the British 
High Command amid accusations and counter-accusations of who was to blame for the 
German gains at La Lys. All that the Portuguese had insisted on—an independent army 
corps, a distinctly Portuguese sector, a Portuguese communiqué—had counted for little. 
Worse still, as postwar correspondence with J. E. Edmonds showed, the 2nd Division’s rout 
became the defining image in British minds of Portugal’s contribution to the common 
effort. Episodes from the retreat became tales that grew with the telling. Brigadier A.T. 
Beckwith, commander of the elite 51st Highland Division’s 152nd Brigade, stationed behind 
the Portuguese on 9 April, would describe them as “in full ventre-à-terre” by the time his unit 
reached their line, adding that he had witnessed many episodes unworthy of inclusion in a 
work such as Edmonds’.”26 The commander of another Highland brigade, the 154th, 
mentioned “the complete and hasty flight of the Portuguese from the front,” explaining 
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that once his men had set themselves up for battle he could not see a single Portuguese 
soldier, wounded or not.27 Various officers mentioned the theft by the Portuguese of the 
bicycles belonging to the XI Corps Cyclist Battalion, which had also moved forward to 
support the embattled Portuguese.28 Another officer explained that the Portuguese had 
fled, with three men riding each mule found on the way. The CEP had become a simple 
and, for some, amusing, footnote in the history of the conflict. 
However, the British also lost an opportunity to make the most of a willing ally’s 
offer of help. There were evident shortcomings in the Portuguese Expeditionary Force—
not least of all a shortage of officers, whatever their competence, as well as very real doubts 
about why Portugal had entered the conflict—but there was also a genuine desire on the 
part of the Lisbon government to contribute to the overall Allied victory, an outcome on 
which, for its members, the future of the Republic seemed to depend. What is more, as 
figures like Ker admitted, the CEP did improve over time. Even Haig noted in his diary, on 
March 1918, that the “Portuguese men look very much fitter than when they arrived just a 
year ago”—although the officers remained, in his eyes, “a poor lot,” who did not “look 
after their men when off parade.”29 Norton de Matos had dreamt of sending a much larger 
force to France. Even if Portugal’s economic difficulties and the need to defend its 
colonies rendered this an impossible dream, it cannot be said that the British capitalized on 
what was made available to them by Lisbon. 
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